

Feb 89

Themselves

1. SU as sole architect of strategy.

Questions
for review

3. What risks were they willing to accept?

2. Did "they" under-estimate, or over-estimate risks?
(Both, in some respects)

4. What routes could have led to ^{US-SU} conflict?
to Invasion of Cuba? Esc? In one way? CW?

5. What did K plan, or it, or Berlin?
What would be done if ...

6. How would invasion of Cuba gone?

7. Super-survey (PSACM) for Sept 7 on (status 6 Sept?)

8. If won't SAMs deployed first, for deterrence?
Was there an urgency, a deadline, on Berlin?

Was there cover with abetment?

e.g. for that CSC need take strong
measures, if it discovered SAMs before they were up,
after detection?

or, was power of SAMs thought to be enough? to deter
(It almost was! 4 Oct Wright memo)

But see

Threats/Assess

6 Feb 89

9. Did K/SD not consider that this was
more likely to fail? Plan a SD response to US moves?

(See SNIE Oct 17 annex, "rational, calculatory
assess")

[Sofrat: - risks are high

- risks are substantiated by SNIE;
which makes the high]

(However, SNIE's assumption that SD went

here planned to respond abroad, if necessary

- about existing world (vs. "bands; hobby, hobby...")

- leads to over-estimate of risks of some possible
US actions, due to US caution.

"Boring effects of
'paranoia' of
superpowers ("rational")
aggressive response. (in Nitze, 1961, Berlin)

10. Invasion planning in October

(Based on more thought, evidence, suspicion of
possible SSMs than SD wanted - the more - to
act, in view of 1) Rhee/Kopty changes

2) USG (e.g. NSC 51) measures, before
election - which went beyond meeter evidence
(see McCone - DCI - and

(Did SD itself feel confident - despite evidence,
suspicions SD could not do it?)

(e.g. SNIE)

In view of: what?

- Warning

- Balashikov?

- steps of other SD states?

This incredibly would not have looked good; nor would
PSALM, which would have looked suspicious (like FOR's
meeting before Pearl Harbor) - e.g. as if JFK planned to concentrate for

(Didn't he plan at least to be able to conceal
[pointless lies - & Right!] "written either/
(possible/probable) false claim - tell after election

or "tell we know for sure"

or "tell we ~~had~~ should what to do."

(Perhaps wrong was about refugee reports - false reports
yet - PSALM instituted after II-28o "published" -
to which Pres did not want to react.

F. MA. ~~and says at~~

11. VPK fear of effect on Aden, of having his
assassins falsified (see JFK-Mitogyan)

12. Was there no intent (possibly) to involve Cuba -
about SSMS?

13. Actual acts of use of SSMS permitted by USC, if
Cuba attacked. Then, intent effect.

SU FU Shut - Use

"Mashers" - "Doors of control"

Cf. tea mugs in Empire;

PI's

14. Relation of law now to election. (see
(+ US now!)

assassins (which constituted "smite,"
created "crisis")

(see Mitogyan - JFK L9 Nov 62)

(SU not going to tell tell after election - to spare JFK
'embarrassment' - a favor?/ (and insure us. JFK return
to Rep. person! But why not hold back whole operation tell

after election?

1989 answer: SC fear of mission - October!

From mole in Moscow? (error? "Proposal rejected")

But Moscow was not rejected - and it needed a mission - and could have been brought to one!

(see 1964-65! 34A \rightarrow TG \rightarrow RT \rightarrow mission!
as well as Cuba I!)

and Moscow: spring '62

Oct 15 - who planned, initially?

What was "rejected" in March '62?

Wh., if any, were ambitious goals of Moscow rejected (as opposed, perhaps, to planned schedule, as of March, culminating in Oct.!)

see Moscow - Was the failure of SC to submit 85Ms - (or before) JFK, 29 Nov 82 Oct 22, - after, sixty the continuation of a SC steering plan (meant to be terminated in Nov⁸⁻¹⁰, not before;

file, - file + U-2, 1960

- JFK + CI (Stevenson at UN)

- Gandamur + Chernobyl

- Andropov + KAL-007?

3) Hyp: There was an SU/K plan to slow down, delay, and, JFK response to missiles: messengers, lack of clear rationale, that to Reich? (concealment planned, but rejected)
b) Urgency (e.g. not exploiting 85Ms) based on form of mission before election!

- d. - SC been & extracted, now nothing

Theses

1. A lesson: - Errors ^{happen} and are still being
(Count operates)
 - so mis-learning can still take place!
(of laws, and of B+W!)
 - (an invasion)
 - and role of law "misperception"
2. Hidden fight over "equal - equal rights, states"
3. SU "thrust" to US ^{neutralize} global + Empire FO thrusts.
(not to ultimate US FS thrust; equality of all thrusts)
but, thrust of nationality, renewing both,
replacing one-sided US FS thrust.
4. SU ^{FO} thrust to renew US thrust/option of
invading Cuba
thus, consolidating SU/Cuba/Castro "base" in Cuba.
(rocking JFK coups of 1960!
and finally JFK invasion of Cuba I!
(JFK/RFK felt at heart as they about
5. fait FA Pacts main Castro, or R about Ortega
Khadafy
Namibia
5. See joint FA pacts -
causing crisis for JFK (starting Oct 16)
and for K (starting Oct 22):
Right after both: Oct 27
to agree in, under threat.
(not a compromise, but the two
proposals as of morning Oct 27)
(no K proposal on night of Oct 26,
which JFK "accepted." That was
a face-saving situation by JFK, though
I don't know if I can believe it's K's!

- US view of "non-part" , asymmetry of rights

- N: good vs. bad (Real War)

- our global responsibilities

obligations

commitments

needs
stocks, cover

(result of: allies

Cola; ME oil/Don
West Europe

as strength (especially)

Con K to NFK at Vienna: ✓

"We have commitments or

Don't 'miscalculate'

K: you have subtle ways of making threats

NC

- our rights to threats & exist ^{use}
(both are "uses" of power)

(for "good," "useful," "threats," "commitments," "responsibilities")

(We did not ask to be watched at the
gates, but there is no one else")

NC

- right to role, exist"

(These follow from use), and right to
use, opinion force; it "compts"
"threat" + "aid" ...

- right to Open Door - "level playing field"

(in other) countries:

at least/part of ^{and} all other foreign
countries, but ^{prob. not} the
domestic fin them).

- Open Door wanted to US attacks, if necessary,
vs. (China Migs (1961)), SSMs (SAMs) 1962

Strategic Migs, USA and not detain

Thus

→ Strategy of provocation of provocation
success of
failure of "

(Cuba I; magoos; TG/34A/Phiar; Ninga

- Cuban strategy (?) → cause general uprising, revolt, by harassing, sabotaging economy (get any to defect? see CIA, Aug 62
mid-
(see 1961, dealing with CIA, Tech Services?) from Chile 1970-73; Guatemala?
Boston/CIA, Oct 62 (Brazil?)
Meiniga?

- US from (SUSPECTS?) of longitudinal esp
Cuba - Berlin on SNE

- Corruption in machine
(in LBJ/aiders; LBJ/RFK; me to Mr. Gordon;
MCG's Tantus; McN to USA demonstrators;
Van/VC, Kastro, 72; F. MA's; JFK/RFK/Castro
Bread & Butter
(RFK like R/North vs. Kastro & Ortega?)

Bread & Butter, 61 - Díaz Castro exigente pub. of invasion; manipulate
Sons, hopefully into support & pledge, actually
into SSMS?

Handwritten

3 hours

→ Strategy of promotion of prevention
comes of " "
fails of "

(Cola I; mogosan; TB/34A/Pliau; Niang

- Castro strategy (?) → cause general uprising, revolt, by harassing, sabotaging economy
 (get Army to defect?
 see CIA, Aug 62
 Chile 1970-73; Guatemala?
 (Brazil?)
 Meaçana?
 mid-
 (see of 1961 dealing with CIA, Tech Services?) from
 Boston / CIA, Oct 62
- US from (SUS hits?) of bourgeois class
 Cuba - Bolivia
 see SNE
- Competition in machine
 (see LBJ / aides; LBJ/RFK; me to Mr. Johnson;
 McG's Tantum; McN to USSR demonstrators;
 Van / VC, Kontum, 72; R. MA's; JFK/RFK / Castro
 Brazil - Chile
 (RFK like R/North vs. Khodabog or Ortega ?!)
- Diaz Castro exagerate prob. of invasion; manipulate
 Soviets, hopefully its support + pledge, actually
 its SSMS?

Brand +
Aug. 61

- Dinal Coates exigente sub. of invasion; minister
Sons, hopefully into attack & prise, actually
into SSM's?

Winchell & Turner

Did itself foster:

27 1. Saw right our missiles as deterring invasion; (after situation)
- this as right?

(changing behavior? yes?)

What did McCarr (Keating?) see as main reason?

(Is Keating alive?)

Did they see it as misdirection for K of Berlin blockade?
(Quincy?)

2. Did they see low assurances as "defensive" weapons
as ambiguous, evasive, non-conclusive?

3. Did US officials tell RFK + JFK behind the own warnings
(42) need be effective? (+ this late second
- thanks, and overruled them: not low
"live, or never"
Why no K amendment?
If US planned to invade, the amendment would

lead to blockade, or invasion (or continue / way to
attack missiles;

like Migs in Miagay)

Ask Soviets: What was the meaning of kept
warnings?

... of friendly US warnings?

Effects - does?

Why didn't they (?) see overflight as the big problem?

(N.Y.: Too late for US to react?)

- give detonation?

- give above of SI warning?

- give so surprising speed of
detonation over a city?

(West Point Nuclear attack: most of
zeros)

What were they not telling? Tell?

0. Motives for US F3 blockade; US F4 threats (Bulger) X
(Effect of Cuban diplomats on)
1. Mongoose. X (only cursory discussion by officials)
2. Invasion planning: ^{JFK} April '62 X (denied)
Oct '62 X (dry winter (McN) or湿润)
3. Assess. efforts. significant
Lack of briefing (by McN, others) = edge in strategic balance, or power
4. JFK willingness to trade IRBMs. ("March" - as assigned to Stevenson). X (McN)
5. RFK offer of private deal. X (McN)
6. RFK ultimatum on IRBMs. Brent: X (McN)
[For Stevenson + McN: this was a bluff, not 48 hrs.
7. RFK warning on ^{new} shootdown. X (don't know, focus on it)
8. Mongoose after Cuban II: - through March 63
- after " 63-Nov 63
- 1964
9. PAGACM, + similar restrictions on division. X (McN)
10. (Sons): What did K "learn" about JFK - + USG - from Bay of Pigs? Vietnam? Wall? Bulger? Bul. 25? X (McN)
38: non-Bul. since '63
11. (Sons): What K under took down, or Berlin or Surry or SCHLES, RFK \$12 X (McN)
if missiles struck; or if invasion.
not just, planned
12. (Sons): What was intent of warnings + assumed on Berlin and on detention; and timing of preempt (not detention? To mission forces?) WHY NOT SAMs FIRST? (WHAT WAS RUSH?)
if missiles not operational?
13. (Sons): Did offer of a private deal on IRBMs have any effect at the time? Help later? X (McN)

"²³" info: Vienna
Paris

— Nitze interview
— " notes

My CFR seminar

— Crisis Pattern — F. MA.

[Assadini

Dobrotar]

— Nitze

— NSC - Aug ²³, before 6

— Hilfstrasse speech (F.U) (Chagrin) (Hans)

my proposed message to K, by JFK on 1st

JFK Aug 25th speech

CHECK WITH RIKYNE !

- Effect of Hilfstrasse — on situation; didn't change "balance" (of FS)

- Aim of SU to match/equal US FS cap — force, without
US FS threat (e.g. on Berlin) (allow SU to offer more moderation),
as to China: to threaten SU retaliate, without so much fearing
US escalation (but it triggers SU FS);

||| US FS threat rested on MONOPOLY OF FS/PREEMPTIVE THREAT,
HENCE MONOPOLY OF THREAT TO ESCALATE.

(Jung, in '90s: superiority = FS threat
or even partial " " "

is a better basis for US threat of FS than
there is absence of FS threat for US
or (want) SU monopoly of FS threat
(= US, 1955-64)

- hit with Berlin (vis. warning) + ultimatum

- JFK secrecy before Oct 15 (K anticipated, control on?)

What was learned from crisis?

1. Lessons:
 - a) to be cautious with US nation
- NOT TO RELY ON LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON US! (Sellers/RPR, 505)
 - b) Not to put MRBMs in NVN
(or Migs in Nicaragua)
 - c) Not to refrain from aid to DRV
- to refrain from putting SANs, Migs, in NVN
 - d) TO SEEK MILITARY PARITY (the hard way) in Nicaragua
not, McN law
BEFORE EXPECTING DIPLOMATIC PARITY McN partner

2. Avoid brinkmanship: without crisis.

2. Not: Soviets don't have total control over small allies.
- Not: (immediately): STOP MONGOOSE; give up (?) invasion thoughts.
3. Not: bring in real experts on local affairs: + Soviets.
4. Not: McN's law (immediately): not true, from Cuba II (\rightarrow VN) 100

5. "Graduated pressure" is best, + work; avoid "intransigence"
(Blockade; \Rightarrow 34A, RT, troops ("not irreversable" 49
action (Ball, 25))

6. 34A (\Leftarrow Mongoose) is worth using.
(for provocation?)

7. Avoid, if possible, incursion (NVN) that injures big
(bands, fuel, over-drawn; yes as in SU or China. (not so much: that will fail)
+ no) as in Cuba

8. Not: be ready to make major concessions
rather than get in large, limited war
(Maybe: ... try to avoid war with SU or China).
- committing effects of initial combat (RT, troops)

9. No lessons about: - actual combat opd us. "McN's law")

- form of crisis (VN, etc.)
to stimulate us
- either a small ally/Client/partner
- CR, civil war, smaller war
- public support during long war

10. (LBS, NOT N): Don't rely on EU that.

- where did Kestig get his estimate, Oct 10
Did JFK believe he had a Rope race, No one,
who was forcing his hand?
Was this a hollow excuse - excuse?
How did JFK react?
(see summary of Bonin contact)
(Walter E. Luhn, 1964)

- "First letter" on 26th, always described wrong;
2d, also, as "racing the anti". B+W, 255

- 256: more than 2 Dob/RFK talks: one in Embassy,
one in frustration?

- Role of emotion:

- F.M.A... violent, etc.

- response to violent attack

370, B+W

- by Sous (see SNE; Mikoyan; JFK's est. of EK)

- by JFK (to other men near plane)

- of

- Panay issue (B+W 257) rejects

nitro fuel

dip. "

- Castro meetings (AA; ...) (no. B/W 259)

see Castro / Marking

- What is the meaning of the Einstein / Oron statement?
"New things" - ^{atmospheric} post-war (see Mikoyan,
B+W 259-60)

- US - Imperial relations to Cuba (USA...)
- US "imperial" of states (JFK - McNamara - willing to subjugate)